NOTE
DERIVATIVE SUIT SETTLEMENTS:
IN SEARCH OF A NEW LODESTAR
I
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has characterized a stockholder's right to sue on
behalf of the corporation as "the chief regulator of corporate management." '
Although a myriad of issues surrounds shareholder derivative litigation, 2 the
scope of this note is restricted to certain problems encountered in the
settlement of such actions. Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter Rule 23.1) governs the settlement of shareholder derivative
actions in federal courts. Rule 23.1 provides in relevant part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a
right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, ... [t]he action shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs.

Numerous states now have statutes that either duplicate Rule 23.1 or contain
3
substantially similar requirements.
After reviewing several introductory matters, this note discusses four
perplexing issues necessarily raised by the settlement of shareholder
derivative litigation:
(1) The potential conflicts of interest between the plaintiff and his
attorney;
(2) The appropriate criteria courts should consider in deciding whether
to approve a settlement;
(3) The role of objecting shareholders in the settlement process; and
(4) The method for computing counsel fee awards.
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1. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. For a discussion of other issues surrounding shareholder derivative litigation, such as
standing, state security for expenses statutes, the adequacy of counsel, and the right to a jury trial,
see H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 1019 (3d ed. 1983). For a discussion of the
history and purpose of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, see 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.1.01 (2d ed. 1984); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1821 (1972).
3. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1; ARM. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ARK. R. CIv. P.
23.1; COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.147 (West 1984); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-123(d)(1982); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23(f); IND. TRIAL RULE 23.1; KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-223(e);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.245 (Baldwin 1984); MASS. R. Civ. P. 23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06; NEV.
R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(d) (McKinney 1984); UTAH R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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The History and Purpose of Rule 23.1

Notice to the shareholders and court approval of a proposed dismissal or
settlement of a shareholder derivative suit have been required since the
adoption of Rule 23(c) in 1938. 4 It was not until 1966, however, that
Congress enacted Rules 23(e) 5 and .23.1. Although Rules 23(e) and 23.1
plainly preserved the notice and court approval requirements found in Rule
23(c), they established separate treatment for class actions and derivative
suits. 6 The clear differentiation of class actions from shareholder derivative
7
actions was a response to the "distinctive aspects" of derivative litigation.
An action may be said to be representative when it is based upon a primary or
personal right belonging to the plaintiff-stockholder and those of his class. It is
derivative when the action is based upon a primary right of the corporation but which
is asserted on its behalf by the stockholder because8 of the corporation's failure,
deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary right.

Despite these significant differences, pre-1966 decisions involving derivative
actions under Rule 23(c) are still considered authoritative precedent. 9 In
addition, the common ancestry of Rules 23(e) and 23.1 renders cases
involving the dismissal or settlement of class actions relevant by analogy to
derivative suits. ' 0
At least three major reasons exist for requiring notice and court approval
of a proposed dismissal or settlement of a derivative action. First, these
prophylactic procedures help discourage "private settlements"" whereby a
4. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1797, at 226, § 1839, at 427; Haudek, The
Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part I, 22 Sw. LJ. 767 (1968).
5. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
6. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1839, at 427; Haudek, supra note 4, at 770.
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee note.
8. Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
9. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1797, at 226, § 1839, at 427; see Feder v.
Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1839, at 427; cf Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153,
157-60 (3d Cir. 1975); Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Weiner v.
Winters, 50 F.R.D. 306, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (cases treating class actions and shareholder derivative
suits interchangeably when discussing problems inherent in both).
11. Prior to the adoption of Rule 23(c), it was widely accepted that a derivative plaintiff owed no
duty to the corporation. Because the plaintiff bore all the expenses of the action, he possessed
absolute discretion over the termination of the suit. As a result, the parties often agreed on a "buyout" arrangement whereby the plaintiff simply voluntarily dismissed his suit in exchange for
consideration greater than his individual interest. The defendant stood to gain a great deal from
"buying off" the plaintiff at inflated amounts since the derivative suit sought a much larger sum of
money. Other shareholders possessed no right to participate in the proceeds of the "private
settlement," and, moreover, had no standing to object to the action's termination. Once the suit was
terminated, the right of fellow stockholders to intervene also ceased. At this point, the statute of
limitations or laches often barred other shareholders from bringing a new action on the same
grounds. The state of the law clearly encouraged vexatious litigation by plaintiffs hoping to secure a
private settlement despite the dubious merit of their claims. Private settlements also enabled
corporate defendants to suppress meritorious claims via the "buy-out" arrangement. Rule 23(c) and
its progeny-Rules 23(e) and 23.1-were designed to curb these problems by requiring court
approval and notice to shareholders before a derivative suit could be dismissed. See Haudek, supra
note 4, at 768-70; Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 321-25 (1937); cf Note,
Recurrent Problems in Action Brought on Behalf of a Class, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 123-127 (1934).
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plaintiff is persuaded to abandon his suit in return for payments vastly in
excess of his individual equity interest.' 2 In other words, judicial scrutiny and
notice to shareholders of a proposed settlement protect nonparty
shareholders from "fainthearted" plaintiffs who compromise their claims in
exchange for individual satisfaction.1 3 Second, the notice requirement' 4 not
only provides stockholders with an opportunity to be heard, but also broadens
the informational foundation upon which the court will evaluate the
settlement. 15 Finally, the notice and court approval requirements minimize
the danger that, due to the general contingent nature of fee recovery in
derivative actions, the plaintiff shareholder's attorney may compromise his
settlement to secure his
client's interest by accepting an inadequate
16
compensation and avoid the risk of litigation.
Thus, the purpose behind obtaining judicial approval of shareholder
derivative settlements is to protect shareholders from unjust or collusive
settlements.' 7 Court approval of a derivative settlement, assuming the notice
requirement is met, operates as a final judgment on the merits.' 8 This finality
ensures an equitable result by barring any subsequent action by the
corporation or nonparty shareholders on identical or substantially similar
claims. 19
12. See Schlusselberg v. Colonial Management Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 733, 741 (D. Mass. 1974);
Birnbaum v. Birrel, 17 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
13. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 223-25 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 912 (1971); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 867 (1945).
14. Rule 23.1 requires notice of a proposed settlement or dismissal in such manner as the court
directs. Notice is generally mailed to each shareholder of record. Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp.
433, 442 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Birnbaum v. Birrel, 17 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). However, New
York, for example, requires notice of a settlement only if "the interests of the shareholders ... will
" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(d) (McKinney 1984). Although notice
be substantially affected ..
ordinarily is mailed, the court may permit notice by publication when the settlement recovery,
relative to the expense of individual notification, is not cost beneficial. See Blau v. Brown & W.
Nuclear, Inc., 1967-1969 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,263 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The settlement notice must describe the terms of the proposed settlement, including any fee
agreement between the plaintiffs counsel and the defendants. The notice also must identify the time
and place for the shareholders to raise objections and must state that the settlement stipulation is on
file with the court and available for public inspection. Haudek, supra note 4, at 783-84, 787-88; 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1839, at 429-30; see also Sweet v. Birmingham, 65 F.R.D. 551,
556 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rogers v. Hull, 34 F. Supp. 358, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (specifically requiring
shareholder notice and court approval of a fee arrangement). The purpose of such notice is to
provide shareholders with sufficient information to decide whether they should agree with or object
to the proposed settlement. The expense of such notification is borne by the beneficiary
corporation. Haudek, supra note 4, at 788.
15. For further discussion, see infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion, see infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
17. Schlusselberg v. Colonial Management Assocs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 733, 741 (D. Mass. 1974).
18. See Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981); Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64, 6567 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 443 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
19. See cases cited supra note 18. When there is insufficient notice of the settlement's content,
however, the settlement is binding only upon the named parties to the action. See generally 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1840, at 438-42. Furthermore, the court-approved settlement
is not res judicata as to any cause of action a stockholder possesses in his own right against the
corporation or its directors and officers. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 442 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
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Settlement of a Shareholder Derivative Action-An Illustration

A typical shareholder derivative suit is filed either by a single shareholder
or by a group of minority shareholders who believe the corporation has been
wronged and that its directors and officers refuse to seek redress. 20 Before
filing a derivative action, the plaintiff shareholder must make a formal demand
on the board of directors to remedy the corporate injury, 2 1 unless a majority
of the board has participated in the alleged wrongdoing thereby rendering
any such demand futile.2 2 The derivative action is comprised of three parties:

the complaining shareholder, the beneficiary corporation, and the alleged
wrongdoer. Under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 the
corporation, despite failing to enforce the claim in its own right, is an
indispensable party to the litigation and must be joined as a nominal
24
defendant.
20. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 487-88 (4th ed. 1983).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 543
(1949); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). The purpose behind such a requirement is to allow
the corporation an opportunity to vindicate its own rights before a shareholder attempts to do so on
its behalf. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548; Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460-61.
22. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1959); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461
(1882); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1029 (1981). The plaintiff shareholder is also required to make a similar demand on the remaining
shareholders if a majority vote of these shareholders could rectify the alleged wrong. See Surowitz v.
Hilton Hotels, 383 U.S. 363, 365 n.4 (1966); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. at 461; Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1970); Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). For further discussion, see also H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at
1069-73; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1831, at 373, § 1832, at 383.
23.
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court
ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if...
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action an is so situated that the disposition of
the action in his absence may. . . leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest . . .
FED.

R. Civ. P. 19.

24. Koster v. American Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Tryforos v.
Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1976); Kaufman
v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). In addition,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides that Rule 23.1 cannot expand the jurisdiction of United
States district courts. Because the corporation is an indispensable party, its citizenship must be
considered when federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. A
corporation is a citizen of the state of its incorporation as well as the state where it has its principal
place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). "Complete diversity between the plaintiffs and
defendants is required for there to be a controversy between citizens of different states." H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 1025. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be a citizen of either the
company's state of incorporation or its principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction to exist.
Since the corporation is a nominal defendant, the real defendants typically will request the court to
realign the corporation as a plaintiff in the hope of destroying diversity of citizenship. For example,
"[s]uppose a New York resident who is a shareholder of a Pennsylvania corporation with principal
place of business in Pennsylvania sues derivatively in a federal district court an alleged wrongdoer
who is a citizen of Pennsylvania. If the corporation is realigned as the real party plaintiff [diversity of
citizenship is destroyed]." Id. For many years the confusion over the proper alignment of the
corporation forced courts to "look behind the pleadings and thereby realign litigants in accordance
with their real interests. This in effect often meant a preliminary determination on the merits to
resolve thejurisdictional issue." Id. at 1026; see, e.g., Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); Carr
v. Beverly Hills Corp., 237 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1956), revdper curiam, 354 U.S. 917 (1957). Whether to
treat the corporation as a real party plaintiff or a nominal defendant depended on the degree of
antagonism displayed by the corporation toward the defendants. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra
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Settlement negotiations in the typical derivative action begin once the
complaint has been filed. Not surprisingly, settlement agreements are viewed
favorably by the courts because they are a means of amicably resolving
shareholder concerns and avoiding costly trials. 2 5 Courts also strongly
encourage settlements to avoid the potential uncertainties and expenses
incident to wasteful litigation. 2 6 Despite the important policy considerations
favoring settlements, the law will sanction such an agreement only if reached
28
fairly, 2 7 that is, free from any collusion or improper conduct.
After the settlement agreement is executed, it is generally submitted to the
court for approval with the plaintiffs petition for attorney fees and a request
for a hearing on the settlement's substantive fairness. 29 Prior to the
settlement hearing, however, notice of the terms of the settlement, including
any counsel fees petitioned for by the plaintiff, is mailed to the shareholders
of record. 30 If the court approves the settlement, a consent order is issued
and the judgment precludes further litigation of such claims by the
corporation and its shareholders. Both judicial rejection and approval of a
proposed settlement are appealable decisions. 31 Although the corporation is
a nominal defendant, it is entitled to receive any settlement recovery. 32 As a
note 2, at 1026; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1822, at 306-07. Confusion over the
level of antagonism necessary to establish the corporation's jurisdictional status was effectively
resolved by the companion cases of Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957), and Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91 (1957). Following these decisions, courts were no longer required to probe the merits of
the case to determine degrees of antagonism, for both opinions made it clear that the level of
antagonism was to be determined "on the face of the pleadings and by the nature of the
controversy." Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. at 96. The gravamen of these decisions, as pointed out by
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion to both cases, is "that collusion aside, whenever a
corporation refuses to bring a suit and a derivative suit is brought by stockholders on its behalf, the
corporation is always to be aligned as a defendant for purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction." Id. at 98 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 117
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Consequently, if the persons in control of the corporation refuse
to remedy the disputed transaction or if the demand requirement is excused, the corporation must
be aligned as a nominal defendant. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 1026; 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1822, at 308. For further analysis, see H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 1025-26, 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1822, at 301-11. It
should be noted, however, that in the event realignment creates diversity of citizenship, a federal court
cannot entertain the action if the motion for realignment is intended to create federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1; e.g., Rogers v. Valentine, 426 F.2d 1361, 1363 (2d Cir. 1970).
25. Edwards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 105, 116 (6th Cir. 1977); Pearson v. Ecological
Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976); D.H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); see also
Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 474, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
26. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 556 F. Supp. 1117, 1157 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Stull v. Baker, 410
F. Supp. 1326, 1333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
27. Randolph v. Ottenstein, 238 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (D.D.C. 1965).
28. In re Scientific Control Corp., 80 F.R.D. 237, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
29. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1839, at 429; Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal
of Stockholders' Actions-Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
30. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.

31. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 772-74 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
32. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970); In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Sec. &
Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1068 (3d Cir. 1976); Sweet v. Bermingham, 65 F.R.D. 551, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). When the defendants own a large majority of the corporate stock, however, the

recovery accrues directly to the minority shareholders rather than the corporation. In this situation,
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general rule, however, the corporation must reimburse the plaintiff for his
expenses, 33 and pay any defendant indemnification expenses for which it is
34
responsible.
The plaintiff may recover attorney fees from the nominal defendant
corporation if a "substantial benefit" accrues to the corporation as a result of
the derivative action. 3 5 Attorney fees may be awarded even though there is no
monetary award so long as a substantial benefit is conferred upon the
corporation. 3 6 Moreover, there is no requirement that the plaintiff in a
derivative suit prevail in order to recover attorney fees. 3 7 Rather, the
settlement of a derivative suit need only result in substantial benefit to the
38
corporation to permit the plaintiff to recover attorney fees.
There are two justifications for breaching the "American rule,"

39

which

requires the prevailing party to pay its own legal expenses including attorney
fees. First, a corporate recovery will have a de minimus impact on the plaintiff

shareholder's individual equity, and will rarely a
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compensate counsel who incurred the risk of litigation and obtained the
42
recovery.
C. The Criteria for Court Approval of Proposed Settlements in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation
The decision whether to approve a proposed settlement in a shareholder
derivative suit is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 4 3 A
reviewing court will not reverse this decision unless the trial court clearly
abused its broad discretion. 4 4 Courts have considered a number of relevant
factors in deciding whether to approve a settlement. Accordingly, this note
seeks (1) to alleviate confusion by consolidating these different factors into a
working model (the "Model") for future court application, and (2) to suggest
alternatives to the highly deferential level of scrutiny courts presently accord
settlements between plaintiffs counsel and the defendant.
1. Synthesizing Present Approaches into a Unified Model. It is well established
that "[b]efore approving the settlement of a derivative action, the [c]ourt
must be satisfied that the compromise 'fairly and adequately serves the
interests of the corporation on whose behalf the action was instituted.' -45
"[W]hether another team of negotiators might have accomplished a better
settlement," however, "is a matter equally comprised of conjecture and
irrelevance. ' ' 4 6 The burden of proving a settlement's fairness and adequacy
falls squarely on the proponents of the compromise. 4 7 Since courts often
encounter difficulty applying this general standard to complex settlements,
the Model suggests dividing the standard into two subparts-fairness and
adequacy-by applying a two-tiered system of review. 48
42. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 378
F. Supp. 883, 886 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (dictum), rev'don other grounds, 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1841, at 443-44. Such contributions, however, are tax
deductible. B.T. Harris Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 635 (1958); Shoe Corp. of Am. v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 297 (1957).
43. Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156
(3d Cir. 1975); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721,725-26 (6th Cir. 1942); Berger v. Dyson, Ill F. Supp.
533, 535 (D.R.I. 1953); see also Rosenfeld v. Black, 336 F. Supp. 84, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Birnbaum v.
Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
44. United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumer Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655 (7th Cir.
1971); see also In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1070 (3d Cir. 1976);
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1975).
45. Mathes v. Roberts, 85 F.R.D. 710, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436,
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (both quoting Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658, 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)); see also Siegal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978); Desimone v. Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
46. In re Corrugated Antitrust UItig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 998
(1982).
47. Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
48. For decisions suggesting the application of the proposed two-tier fairness and adequacy
system of review, compare In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315
(D. Md. 1979), with Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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a. Ensuringfairness in the settlement. Prior to evaluating the adequacy of the
corporation's net recovery or nonpecuniary relief, the reviewing court should
consider the propriety or fairness of the settlement negotiations themselves. 4 9
The purpose of this initial review is to alert the court to possible collusive
settlement negotiations between plaintiffs counsel and the defendants. 50 Any
evidence of improper bargaining should signal the court to increase its
scrutiny of the settlement's adequacy, 51 insofar as the probability of a
52
collusive settlement producing an inadequate recovery is substantial.
Factors tending to reveal the "fairness" of a settlement are obviously those
that indicate the presence or absence of collusion among parties. Because of
the danger that plaintiffs counsel might compromise a suit to insure his fee,
the court must determine that the settlement was reached as a result of good
faith bargaining at arm's length. 53 To facilitate this initial investigation, the
Model suggests that courts impose on parties an obligation to satisfy the
following requirements as a type of litmus test for fairness:
Plaintiffis and defendant's counsel should each submit an affidavit assuring the
court and the shareholders of arm's5 4 length bargaining and adherence to the ban
on contemporaneous negotiations.
b. Proponents' counsel should be "experienced, able, and respected members of the
bar . . who have represented numerous clients in similar cases." 5 5 Such
experience should help produce a beneficial settlement without saddling the
recovery with extensive litigation expenses.
c. Proponents' counsel should be continuing with trial preparations during
demonstrating their willingness to go to trial if in
settlement negotiations, thereby
56
the clients' best interests.
d. Proponents' counsel should5 7 have conducted "sufficient discovery to enable
counsel to act intelligently."

a.

49. See Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Montgomery County Real
Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
50. Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
51. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
52. See, e.g., Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Norman v. McKee,
290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afd, 431 F.2d 769 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
In Jamiscn, for example, after simultaneous negotiations of the settlement award and attorney
fees, plaintiffs counsel proposed a settlement providing the plaintiff class with damages to which
they were already entitled under a prior SEC victory. In consideration of $50,000 in attorney fees,
plaintiffs counsel essentially recommended a settlement that had no value to his client. Therefore,
to review best the adequacy of a proposed settlement, the Model recommends prior investigation
into the fairness of the negotiation process.
53. In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315 (D. Md. 1979); see
Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Weiss v.
Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F. Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 17475 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
54. Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
55. Burger v. CPC Int'l Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see Desimone v. Industrial BioTest Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Montgomery County Real
Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315 (D. Md. 1979); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 174-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
56. Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
57. Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171,
174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315
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Proponents' counsel should demonstrate that "the number of objectants [sic] or
their relative interest is small.''58

The failure to meet any or all of these requirements will rarely result in
automatic rejection of the settlement; however, discovery of such a failure
should alert courts to an increased potential for collusion thereby leading to
intensified judicial scrutiny of the settlement's adequacy. 59 Alternatively, if
the proponents satisfy the requirements and thus establish the decorum of the
60
negotiations, there should be a presumption in favor of the settlement.
b. Establishing the adequacy of the settlement. After determining the fairness of
the settlement negotiations, the court must appraise the adequacy of the
settlement award. 6 1 To best assist the court in making this determination, the
Model recommends judicial consideration of the following factors:
a. First and foremost, the strength of the plaintiffs case in light of
evidence of the best possible recovery, balanced against the proposed
62
settlement award.
b. "[T]he complexity, expense and probable duration of continued
litigation."63

c.
d.
e.

64
The risks of establishing liability and proving damages.
The solvency of the defendant, that is, his ability to withstand a
65
subsequent greater judgment.
66
The type and number of objections from dissatisfied shareholders.

(D. Md. 1979); Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Failure to provide
objectors with adequate discovery may cause a court to reject a proposed settlement. Girsh v.
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157-60 (3d Cir. 1975).
58. See Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
59. See In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315 (D. Md. 1979).
60. See Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
61. See In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315-17 (D. Md.
1979).
62. See Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 500 F.
Supp. 36, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mathes v. Roberts, 85 F.R.D. 710, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lewis v.
Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Failure to provide the court with estimates of the
best possible recovery may result in settlement rejection. See Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 500 F. Supp.
at 45.
63. Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see
Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1975); Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
64. See Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); Girsh v.Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157
(3d Cir. 1975); Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test
Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
65. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test
Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
66. See Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 1978); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d
375, 379-80 (1st Cir. 1974); Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Desimone v.
Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Burger v. CPC Int'l, Inc.,
76 F.R.D. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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The settlement's approval by an independent board of directors
67
and/or a majority of shareholders.
g. The amount of attorney fees for which plaintiff's counsel plans to
petition.
h. The type and amount of indemnification payments that may be paid
to individual defendants.
i. The type and amount of corporate reimbursement available through
indemnification insurance policies on officers' and directors' liability.
To ensure proper evaluation of the adequacy of a proposed settlement,
plaintiff's counsel should submit a reasonably accurate (but not negotiated)
request for attorney fees prior to court approval. This fee request, coupled
with information from factors g through i, provides the court and
shareholders with a complete picture of the estimated net recovery, which will
f.

augment their ability to evaluate the settlement. 68

2. Judicial Scrutiny. "It is not necessary in order to determine whether an
agreement of settlement and compromise shall be approved that the court try
the case [on the merits].... Such a standard of scrutiny would emasculate the
very purpose for which settlements are made." 69 That purpose is twofold:
"[t]o avoid the trial of sharply disputed issues and to dispense with wasteful
litigation." 70 The court, however, should carefully avoid "merely rubber
stamp[ing] whatever settlement is proposed by the parties to a shareholder
derivative action." 7' Rather, the court should exercise its own independent
and objective judgment to form an opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's
72
claim in order to protect the interests of nonparty shareholders.
67. Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974).
68. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1130-31 (7th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
To illustrate, assume that plaintiff's counsel submits a $1,000,000 settlement for court approval,
collusive negotiations do not occur, and the amount is reasonable in light of factors a through f
Without knowledge of factors g, h, and i, the recovery flowing to the corporation may appear
adequate and, as a result, the number of objectors will be small. However, for further illustration,
assume the following facts: plaintiff's counsel plans upon settlement approval to request attorney
fees of $250,000, the corporation indemnifies its officers and directors against fines and litigation
expenses (including reasonable attorney fees and amounts paid in settlement), the defendants incur
$100,000 in litigation expenses, and the corporation maintains an indemnification insurance policy
for 70% of any indemnification payments. The knowledge of factors f through h reduces a gross
settlement of $1,000,000 to a net recovery of $720,000. Therefore, every factor must be considered
before a court can reasonably assess a settlement offer.
69. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Saylor v. Lindsley,
456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D.
305, 316 (D. Md. 1979).
70. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Montgomery County Real Estate
Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 316 (D. Md. 1979).
71. See Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1974); Mathes v. Roberts, 85 F.R.D.
710, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436, 439 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
72. Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 90 F.R.D. 665, 666-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see United Founders Life
Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 1971); Desimone v. Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29,
32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
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In evaluating a proposed settlement in a derivative action, the court's
function is not to substitute its business judgment for that of the negotiators
who bargained at arm's length. 73 Such counsel are intimately associated with
the litigation and consequently are far more able to weigh its relative
strengths and weaknesses.74 As a result, the court seeks "only to insure that
the arrangement is not so unfair as to require disapproval." 7 5 Indeed, "[t]he
fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential
recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is [so]
grossly inadequate [that it] should be disapproved."' 76 "The court . . . will
not approve a settlement if it is unfair, but 'fairness' may' 77be found anywhere
within a broad range of lower and upper limits."

Because

of the

presumption in favor of settlements, the degree of scrutiny exercised by
courts in evaluating them 78 should be deferential provided the settlement
negotiations are not collusive. Unless the settlement amount is woefully
inadequate, 79 the negotiations improper,8 0 or an objector brings a material
point to the court's attention, 81 no heightened scrutiny is employed and
approval is highly probable. If the court discovers either the existence of or
potential for collusion, however, judicial scrutiny applied in evaluating the
82
settlement's adequacy should be increased.
By applying the Model's two-tiered system of review, the court's initial
evaluation of the settlement's fairness should also dictate the level of scrutiny
applied in appraising its adequacy. The first tier inquiry, therefore, will reveal
to courts when they should increase their scrutiny of settlements with
collusive potential. The second tier analysis requires evaluation of the
settlement's adequacy under a degree of scrutiny determined by the result of
the first tier. In short, the Model is an analytical device designed to assist
courts in monitoring proposed settlements. While no panacea to the conflict
of interest problems inherent in shareholder derivative litigation, the Model
goes far to ensure that the interests of plaintiff shareholders and the
corporation are adequately safeguarded.
73. Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
74. Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 90 F.R.D. 665, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Desimone v. Industrial BioTest Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29,
32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 431 F.2d 769 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
75. Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
76. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1125 n.24 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
78. See supra notes 43-81 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd,
68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
80. SeeJamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
81. The degree of scrutiny the circuit normally exerts increases once a "complaining
shareholder objects to the settlement." Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
82. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980); cf.Jamison v. Butcher &
Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (rejecting proposed settlement because of potential for
collusion).
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II
THE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION-A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A.

The Problem

During settlement negotiations, counsel for plaintiff and defendant may
agree on a proper fee award in addition to the settlement terms. In seeking to
minimize its liability, the defendant may implicitly or even explicitly promise
not to oppose the fees petitioned by plaintiff's counsel at the settlement
83
hearing.
The "real" defendants-who are ordinarily corporate directors or
officers-possess strong incentives for reaching a compromise. All states
currently have statutes that indemnify directors, officers, and other corporate
personnel against litigation expenses (including attorney fees) incurred in
defending themselves. 84 Under these statutes, indemnification is mandatory
if the defendants prevail. On the other hand, if the defendants lose,
indemnification is permissive (by vote of noninterested directors) provided
the defendants' disputed behavior was conducted in good faith and in a
manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation. 8 5
Because the settlement of a derivative suit is not a trial on the merits,

86

no

made.8 7

determination of liability or bad faith is ever
Consequently, the
defendants in effect possess an automatic right to indemnification unless the
settlement stipulation expressly excludes it.88 For this reason, the defendants
have a strong incentive not to litigate a derivative claim and thereby risk the
loss of indemnification rights.
To the contrary, it has been argued that there are equally strong pressures
opposing early settlement. The argument is premised on the assumption that
the corporation, seeking to maximize its net recovery, will object to an
inadequate settlement. This behavioral assumption, however, fails to
recognize that the corporation often will receive a larger net recovery by
agreeing to a small settlement amount than by insisting on litigation which
would involve large indemnification expenses and plaintiffs counsel fees. But
while the corporation's acquiescence in the settlement may produce shortterm corporate benefits, the willingness to settle frivolous or grossly inflated
83. See Zilker v. Klein, 540 F. Supp. 1196, 1197-98 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Haudek, supra note 4, at 784.
84. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 1121-32.
85. Id. at 1124 n.10; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1984). Certain permissive statutes
also provide for reimbursement of judgment amounts and/or fines. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, at 1124 n.10.
86. See City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974); Saylor v. Lindsley,
456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972); Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
87. See Haudek, supra note 29, at 784-85.
88. Id.; see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.14
comment c (Council Draft No. 5, Nov. 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov.
1984)]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Intro. Note, at 5,
& § 7.13 (Discussion Draft No. 1, June 3, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June

1985)1.
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claims only serves to encourage these claims, thereby imposing greater longterm costs on the corporation and the judicial system.
Likewise, numerous incentives drive plaintiff's counsel toward settlement.
A settlement is virtually risk free since counsel will collect his fee, whether on
a contingent or hourly basis, provided some identifiable benefit inures to the
corporation. 8 9 When the courts, defendants, and plaintiffs prefer to settle, the
benefits of the adversary system are lost if plaintiff's counsel's preference for
settlement is based upon personal pecuniary considerations rather than on his
client's best interests. Since all the players may suddenly be on the same side,
a conflict of interest frequently arises between plaintiff's counsel and his
client:
Unlike other forms of litigation where the plaintiff's gain essentially comes at the
defendant's expense, the derivative action is a three-sided litigation with three

necessary parties: plaintiff, defendant, and the corporation. As a practical matter, the
first two parties can pass the costs of litigation onto the third by reaching a settlement
90
that maximizes their own [pecuniary] interests, but does not benefit the corporation.

Simply put, plaintiff's counsel can accept a smaller settlement in exchange for
the defendant's acquiescence at the settlement hearing to a larger fee. The
district court injamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd9 ' perceived just such a situation
and, as a result, rejected the proposed settlement. 9 2 Injamison, the plaintiff
class consisted of customers who sought to recoup losses suffered in
purchasing securities from stockbrokers who allegedly sold shares without

disclosing inside information. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
stockbrokers who had nonpublic knowledge of the declining value of Penn
Central Company securities sold Penn Central shares to the plaintiffs without
disclosing the company's financial troubles. Prior to the purchasers' case, the
SEC filed its own action on similar claims and reached a settlement with the
stockbrokers whereby the brokers agreed to establish a $350,000 escrow fund
for disbursal to aggrieved customers. The proposed settlement provided that
the defendants would distribute the $350,000 escrow fund established by the
SEC order to members of theJamison class and pay $50,000 in attorney fees to
counsel for the class representatives. 93 The court rejected the settlement
because the class members were entitled to the $350,000 escrow fund
regardless of the outcome of the class action and, therefore, they would
89.
90.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 1985), supra note 88, Intro. Note, at 5 (citing Saylor v.

Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972)).
91. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977); Saylor v. Lindsley, 456
F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D.
305, 315 (D. Md. 1979); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Norman v. McKee, 290 F.
Supp. 29, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), affrd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); 3B
J. MOORE &J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.25 (2d ed. 1984); Clermont & Currivan,
Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534 (1978); Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney
General: Why the Model of One Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 239-43

(1983); Haudek, supra note 29, at 784.
92. 68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
93. Id. at 480-81.
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receive no benefit from the proposed settlement. 9 4 In rejecting the proposed
settlement, the court admonished the parties for simultaneously negotiating
settlement of the claims and the plaintiffs attorney fees: "[T]he present
arrangement leaves the unfortunate impression that defendants are buying
' 95
themselves out of a lawsuit by direct compensation to plaintiff's counsel.
The problem identified in Jamison is not unique to that case due to the
incentives inherent in shareholder derivative litigation. As one court noted,
"[a] plaintiffs lawyer who has an agreement that defendants will pay his fees
has a strong motive to so conduct himself that defendants will not question or
oppose the amount for which he ultimately applies as a fee. ' 96 By
compromising the client's claim in exchange for a promise not to object to his
petition for fees, plaintiffs counsel and the defendants gain to the
corporation's economic detriment. 9 7 As a consequence, plaintiffs counsel
maximizes his profit and the defendants minimize their liability at the expense
of the corporation. Since lawyers, like most people, are motivated by their
economic self-interest (at least absent unusual altruism), it is hardly surprising
to learn that occasionally counsel fails to champion zealously his client's
cause. The next question, of course, is how to remedy this situation. Because
the source of this conflict is divergent economic interests, the solution
requires a realignment of traditional economic incentives between the plaintiff
98
shareholder and his counsel.
III
SOLVING THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEM

To remedy the conflict of interest problems encountered in settlement
negotiation, at least three possible solutions are available:
(1) Strictly prohibiting contemporaneous negotiation of attorney fees
and settlement awards between plaintiff's counsel and the defendant. 9 9
94. Id. at 482.
95. Id. at 484.
96. Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
97. Of course this type of egregious behavior is not without risk. Plaintiffs counsel would be
susceptible to disciplinary action from the state board of ethics as well as independent lawsuits for
malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty from piqued shareholders. See generally Saylor v.
Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347-48 (2d Cir.
1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting); Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(decisions identifying and describing plaintiff counsel's fiduciary duty to his client). Rather than file a
separate lawsuit, the plaintiff shareholder could choose to appeal the settlement on grounds of
inadequate representation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
98. Cf Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Clermont & Currivan,
supra note 91, at 534-35; Coffee, supra note 91, at 237-38.
99. Hence, plaintiffs counsel should not discuss fees with the defendant until after the
settlement is approved. Counsel for both sides would submit sworn affidavits that simultaneous
negotiation of attorney fees and the settlement award did not occur.
Rejection of the settlement is not automatically required if there are "circumstances present which
appear to neutralize the potential for impropriety." Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) (presence of Department ofJustice representative
during the simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees and the settlement fund served to protect the
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(2) Requiring corporate reimbursement of litigation expenses, including
attorney fees, for objectors whose participation improves the settlement or
provides valuable information to the court.
(3) Altering the method of computing attorney fees to a "modified"
percentage of recovery system.
A.

Banning Contemporaneous Negotiation

Several federal courts have prohibited contemporaneous negotiation of the
settlement amount and attorney fees. 10 0 According to the Third Circuit,
Only after court approval of the damage settlement should discussion and negotiation
of appropriate compensation for the attorneys begin. This procedure may not be
particularly appealing to the parties, but it preserves the benefits of the adversary
system. . . . Moreover, the merits of fee disputes become separated from those of
damages, thus reducing the conflict of interests between client and attorney. This
procedure would make the court's task less burdensome and remove a source of
uneasiness over the
settlement procedure without in any way impairing the power to
10
set a proper fee. 1

By prohibiting the simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees and the
settlement award, the economic interests of the plaintiff's counsel and his
client are realigned so that the adversary system can function properly.
Plaintiff's counsel cannot strike a bargain with his adversary which maximizes
both of their interests at the corporation's expense. In effect, a "two-step"
process is created by requiring that negotiation, notice, and court approval of
the settlement be completed before negotiation, notice, and court approval of
attorney fees.
Although this solution is theoretically sound, two serious practical
problems persist. First, there is no effective means of preventing collusion
between plaintiff's counsel and the defendant. Although courts could require
counsel to certify that simultaneous negotiations did not occur, detection and
enforcement problems would remain. Not to be overlooked, an absolute
prohibition against contemporaneous negotiations will likely encourage
secret negotiations. 0 2 Second, prior to any settlement agreement, potential
objecting shareholders and the beneficiary corporation have a legitimate
interest in knowing what impact litigation expenses will have on the net
recovery.' 0 3 Therefore, disclosure of potential attorney fees is necessary to
evaluate the eventual relief inuring to the corporation.
interests of the class). But "[i]t would rarely be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to reject a
settlement proposal when such combined negotiations take place." Id.
100. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D.
665, 669 (D. Ariz. 1978); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aft'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
101. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977).
102. Haudek, supra note 29, at 784.
103. Id.
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Inducing Productive Objector Participation

1. The Sole Adversary. The second means of ameliorating the conflict of
interest problems in derivative suit settlements is to encourage productive
participation by objectors in the settlement hearing. Objectors can play a
critical and unique role in derivative suit settlements. Their importance stems
from the unusual position of a court asked to approve a compromise reached
by the parties. In contrast to the court's typical position as a neutral arbiter
between two aggressive adversaries, the court is confronted in settlement
hearings with parties who are in absolute agreement. No longer are the
parties true opponents because "[o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys
for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend
the joint handiwork ....

-.104

The court, therefore, must attempt to see

beyond the united front presented by the parties and decide whether the
proposed settlement, including amounts to be withdrawn from the settlement
fund to pay the plaintiffs attorney, is in the corporation's best interest.
Beyond the nonadversary nature of settlement hearings, judicial scrutiny is
necessitated by the unusual and unnatural position of counsel.' 0 5 The
corporation's counsel cannot be expected to champion corporate rights after
the corporation has refused to initiate legal proceedings. Likewise, the
shareholder's counsel, although purportedly vindicating corporate rights,
often has personal economic incentives that compromise those rights.' 0 6
Absent objectors, the court is the only participant in the settlement
proceedings whose perception of corporate interests is not colored by
competing concerns.' 0 7 As a consequence, the court must conduct its own
investigation of the shareholder's claims to determine the fairness and
adequacy of the settlement.' 08
But the degree of judicial scrutiny given a settlement proposal is
necessarily constrained by efficiency considerations. First, the value of
settlement to the parties and the judicial system is diminished to the extent
that the court conducts a lengthy, independent investigation of the settlement
proposal.' 0 9 Second, courts are unaccustomed and unsuited to perform what
is essentially an advocate's responsibility in an adversary legal system.
104.

Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert.

dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1965).
105. For a description of the settlement negotiations in a derivative suit and the participants'
economic interests (which are often at variance with the best interest of the corporation on whose
behalf the suit is brought), see notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
107. The court may, however, look favorably upon the settlement reached by the parties
because of the time and money saved by foregoing litigation of the claims.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 43-82.
109. In seeking to retain the efficiencies of settlement, courts have occasionally understated
their role in the settlement proceedings. See, e.g., Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 90 F.R.D. 665, 666-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("In evaluating a proposed settlement in a derivative action, the Court's function is
not to substitute [its] business judgment for that of the negotiators who bargained at arm's length,
but only to insure that the arrangement is not so unfair as to require disapproval") (citation omitted).
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Consequently, objectors play an important role in settlement proceedings
by enabling courts to perform a truly thorough evaluation of the settlement
proposal"I 0 without undertaking a full-scale investigation of the shareholder's
claims, the settlement negotiations, and the value of the settlement to the
corporation. At the settlement hearing, the objector is the only remaining
adversary of either the plaintiff or the defendant, the only participant whose
purpose is to expose the weaknesses of the settlement agreement, and thus
the only party that allows the court to perform its accustomed function of
neutral arbitration.
The objector does not always benefit the corporation or the court,
however. Both courts and commentators have characterized some objectors'
participation as insubstantial, dilatory, and even extortionate."' The
objector may be regarded as a foe rather than a friend simply because he
presents a new obstacle to a settlement desired by the plaintiff, the defendant,
the corporation, and the overburdened reviewing court." 2 Criticism of an
objector's participation is legitimate, however, to the extent that the
objector's counsel does not seek to prevent an inadequate settlement, but
only to lay his claim to a share of the anticipated legal fees by threatening to
delay approval of the settlement.
Because a court can discourage these counterproductive objectors by
refusing to allow the objector's attorney any fees unless he has in fact
conferred some benefit on the corporation, and because the cost of
entertaining objections is relatively 1oW,1 3 the advantages of objector
participation outweigh its potential for abuse.
110. In a case . . . where there are [objecting shareholders], the court is aided in its task; the
[settlement] proponents can be expected to present evidence and arguments suggesting that the
settlements are within a "range of reasonableness" and the objectors will do the same for the
contrary position. By weighing the competing evidence and evaluating the legal arguments, we
think the court should be able to reach a just conclusion.
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 213 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
998 (1982).
Although the privileges objectors enjoy are subject to abuse, see infra notes 182-83 and
accompanying text, commentators generally agree that the value of objectors to the corporation on
whose behalf the derivative suit is brought and to the integrity of the judicial process can surpass the
costs incurred by giving objectors access to settlement proceedings. As one court has recognized,
objectors provide the court with "the benefit of that broader information which comes from
receiving advice as to the views of all parties concerned and from considering evidence proffered by
them upon the relevant points of the case." Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944); see Coffee, supra note 91, at 263; Haudek, supra note 29, at 803-04.
111. See Roman v. Master Indus., 1966-67 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,806, at 95,751 (July 20,
1966) (objector's attorney conferred no benefit on corporation but only made necessary additional
hearing, caused "additional trouble and expense" to corporation, and took additional court time);
Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 30; see also Whittemore v. Sun Oil Co., .58 F.R.D 624, 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Assuming dilatory conduct by objectors is a significant problem, it could be ameliorated by
penalizing bad faith objections. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., the court of appeal's designation of the district court's objector participation in
Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1263-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1975).
113. The expense of pursuing objections is borne by the objector or his attorney unless the
objector produces some benefit for the corporation which would entitle him to an attorney fee
allowance from the settlement fund. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. Irrespective of the
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Nevertheless, because the role of objectors is not an enviable one, courts
are often deprived of their potentially valuable services." 14 Few shareholders
object to a proposed settlement of which they are notified because there is
little-if any--economic incentive to do so. Unless a shareholder owns a
great deal of stock, the value he personally would derive from an increase in
the settlement amount is extremely minimal. 1 5 Since few objectors have a
sufficient financial interest in the settlement to pay their own attorney fees,
the objector's attorney probably works on a contingency basis"l 6 and
therefore bears the risk of receiving no fees whatsoever. If the objector's
attorney succeeds in preventing judicial approval of the settlement proposal
and then is able to improve the terms of the settlement, he will receive a fee
for his contribution."17 But if he fails to prevent court approval of the
settlement or if he succeeds and his success results in further litigation rather
than settlement of the derivative suit, the objector's attorney ordinarily
receives no compensation, even if his objection was meritorious."18 Due to

the riskiness of reward, it is only the very rare shareholder or his attorney who
is willing to challenge a derivative settlement. Consequently, both the court
and the corporation on whose behalf a derivative suit is brought lose the
benefit of objectors' participation."19
2. Attracting Objectors. To encourage nonparty shareholders to participate in
derivative suit settlement proceedings, courts should modify current practices
in two ways. First, courts should make the role of objector more attractive by
(1) giving the objector broad discovery privileges against both plaintiffs and
defendants to insure that he has adequate information; and (2) rewarding the
objector for providing valuable services by granting his attorney
compensation while at the same time allocating the plaintiff shareholder's
attorney fees in a way that discourages intervention so long as there is
adequate representation of the derivative claim.
a. Discovery. Absent indications of bad faith, objectors should be permitted
broad discovery upon a minimal showing of need. 120 Objectors should have
access to information relating to the underlying derivative claim, the value of
the settlement, the settlement negotiations, and the work performed by
objector's success, the only cost imposed on the court is the time spent hearing the objector's
contentions-probably considerably less time than would be consumed by a full and independent
judicial investigation of the settlement terms.
114. Haudek, supra note 29, at 805.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Transition Elecs. Corp., 326
F.2d 492, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1964); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd sub nom. Singer v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943).
118. Whittemore v. Sun Oil Co., 58 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Milstein v. Werner, 58
F.R.D. 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Newman v. Stein, 58 F.R.D. 540, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
119. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 775 (1944);
Haudek, supra note 29, at 805.
120. Cf Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. 404, 416-17, 197 A.2d 49, 56 (1964).
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attorneys seeking compensation from the fund. Objectors can effectively
protect corporate interests against inadequate settlements and exorbitant
attorney fees only if they have access to all relevant information affecting the
fairness on the proposed settlements.
b. Attorney fees. The objector should be rewarded for providing valuable
services to the corporation and the court by awarding compensation to his
attorney. As many courts have recognized, if the objector is successful in
preventing court approval of the initial settlement and then improves the
settlement terms, he should receive an allowance for attorney fees. 12 1 That
allowance should constitute a substantial percentage of the amount the
12 2
settlement fund is increased by his efforts. As discussed more fully below,
the court should award the objector's attorney fees on the basis of the
additional recovery received by the corporation due to the objector's efforts.
If the objector has produced only nonpecuniary benefits, the court should
place a value on those benefits before awarding any fee to the objector. The
percentage awarded to objectors could be adjusted upward or downward to
encourage what the courts perceive to be the "right" amount of objector
involvement in derivative suit settlements.
Even if the objector is not successful, however, the objector's participation
may have saved the court time and money. 12 3 If the objector has provided
constructive, time-saving information to the court, he should receive modest
attorney fees despite his lack of success in preventing the settlement or
procuring more favorable settlement terms. 24 Expanding the circumstances
under which an objector receives attorney fees would promote productive
nonparty shareholder participation in the settlement process by reducing the
financial risk of objecting.
Admittedly, any reduction in the financial risk of objecting may also
encourage frivolous or extortionate objections to proposed settlements.
These objections may be avoided, however, not only by the court's strict
refusal to award fees to their proponents but also by holding the objector's
attorney liable for excessive costs incurred by the court because of the
25
attorney's vexatious conduct.1
The second modification intended to promote objectors' participation
goes to the very heart of the current practice and relates to the method by
which plaintiff's counsel is compensated. Derivative suits are often brought by
one or more shareholders represented by a single attorney or a single law
firm. Other attorneys become involved after the suit is initiated by
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. The objector's counsel fees should be calculated by the same method as the original
plaintiff's counsel fees. For our suggested fee computation method, see infra pp. 258-60.
123. But see Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (objectors
caused court to spend more hours analyzing complex settlement agreement).
124. See Haudek, supra note 29, at 805-06.
125. Imposing costs on the objector's attorney for vexatious conduct fits squarely within the
language and purpose of federal judicial procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
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representing shareholders who intervene or whose separate parallel suits are
consolidated in the action. 126 If the derivative suit is successful, resulting
either in a settlement or ajudgment in favor of the shareholders, an allowance
for attorney fees is awarded from the fund created by the settlement or
judgment to all counsel who performed productive work in the case. 127 In
derivative suits where intervention and consolidation produce numerous
plaintiffs, the fee allowance is divided into many small awards. The generosity
and frequency with which courts have awarded intervenors a portion of the
fee allowance produces a strong economic incentive for intervention in
derivative suits.' 2 8

Any shareholder who has an interest in the derivative

litigation intervenes within a short time after litigation is initiated and takes
part in the settlement negotiations. The intervenor's attorney then has
precisely the same incentives as the original plaintiffs attorney to compromise
the benefits accruing to the corporation in return for the defendant's implicit
agreement not to oppose the joint request by the intervenor and original
plaintiffs attorneys for a large fee allowance.'

29

If the shareholders who

would intervene at the beginning of a derivative suit were discouraged from
doing so but encouraged to participate as objectors after a tentative
settlement had been reached, not only would the potential for collusion
between the parties be reduced but the court would also enjoy the benefit of
information independent of, and in opposition to, the united position
presented by the parties.
Adjusting the method of allocating fees among the original plaintiff and
intervenors would achieve a substantial shift away from intervention and
toward objection.' 3 0 When initially faced with a derivative suit with the
potential for attracting numerous intervenors, the court should appoint one
or two of the attorneys representing different shareholders as lead counsel in
the case. The attorneys should be carefully selected on the basis of their
ability to represent the shareholders "fairly and adequately."' 3' Once the
court determines that the shareholders are adequately represented, other
shareholders could intervene although their attorneys would not be awarded
a share of any fee allowance from the settlement fund.132 Those shareholders
126. See Haudek, supra note 29, at 768-69.
127. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Milstein v.
Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
128. See Coffee, supra note 91, at 233.
129. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
130. Removing the financial incentives of intervention and consolidation would also address the
"nonexcludability" problem recognized by Professor Coffee. In derivative and class litigation,
multiple attorneys volunteer to serve as counsel for the corporation or class by filing separate
actions. The court consolidates the separate actions, allowing all attorneys to participate in the
consolidated action. As a result, Professor Coffee argues, the individual attorney lacks a sufficient
incentive to invest time and money in developing a derivative or class claim because he cannot
exclude other attorneys from the action and therefore cannot be assured of a sufficiently large fee.
Coffee, supra note 111, at 50-56; Coffee, supra note 91, at 233.
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
132. The attorneys ineligible to receive compensation from the fund could make private
arrangements with lead counsel to perform work on the case, but lead counsel would be under no
obligation to make any arrangements.
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who are interested in the derivative proceedings but no longer have an
economic inducement to intervene or to file parallel suits may decide to
participate in the proceedings as objectors if sufficient financial rewards are
3
available to them for doing so.1 3

By discouraging intervention while encouraging objection, the
corporation's interests will be better safeguarded from the conflicts of interest
intrinsic to shareholder derivative litigation. Because the objector's counsel
has not participated in the settlement negotiations and thus has had no
opportunity to improve his personal financial position at the expense of the
corporation's interests, he will be able to investigate and evaluate the fairness
of the corporation's net recovery

from a far more neutral vantage.

34

Promoting the participation of the adversary objector can be accomplished
most readily by providing objecting shareholders with broad procedural and
discovery rights and by offering them a financial inducement to investigate the
proposed settlement. Implementing these changes not only furthers the
corporation's interests at a relatively low cost, but also protects the integrity
of the approval process.
C.

Returning to a Percentage-of-the-Recovery Fee System

The third solution to the conflict of interest problems in derivative
settlements is to alter the method for calculating the plaintiff's attorney fees.
Although the rule that the corporation must bear the reasonable attorney
fees incurred by the shareholder in litigating a derivative claim is firmly
established,' 3 5 the appropriate method for calculating the amount of these
fees is far from settled. Courts have adopted three basic approaches for
calculating attorney fees or have applied, either explicitly or implicitly, hybrid
methods which incorporate aspects of two or more approaches. After
discussing these three methods and the approach in recent A.L.I.
proposals, 3 6 this note proposes a percentage-of-the-recovery method of fee
calculation 13 7 with modifications that respond to the judicial and scholarly
criticism of that method.

133. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
134. The corporation's net recovery is the gross settlement amount less plaintiWs counsel fees
and indemnification expenses.
135. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
The pubic policy underlying derivative suit litigation is founded on two objectives. The first is
therapeutic-maintaining the economic health of the corporate system through shareholder
oversight of management. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HARV. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956).
The second is prophylactic-providing a deterrent to future
wrongdoing by corporate managers.
136. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 1985), supra note 88, § 7.17; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Nov. 1984), supra note 88, § 7.18.
137. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
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1. Methods of Fee Calculation. Courts have used three methods to determine
the plaintiffs counsel fees in derivative suit settlements. 1 38 The first of these
approach, enjoyed general
methods, the percentage-of-the-recovery
acceptance until the late 1960's. Under this approach, the plaintiffs counsel
is compensated on the basis of the benefit he confers upon the corporation as
measured by the total recovery obtained in the settlement. 3 9 Calculation of
fees is straightforward: the attorney receives a judicially determined
percentage of the corporate recovery. Courts have exercised their discretion
receive between
in setting the percentage figure, but attorneys generally
1 40
twenty and thirty percent of the corporate recovery.
The second method of fee calculation is more difficult to define. This
method will be referred to as the "multifactor" approach, although this term
is not one courts use to describe it. Under the multifactor approach, courts
first identify a number of factors which are considered significant in
determining the amount of attorney fees to which the plaintiff is entitled and
then cryptically announce that amount. 14 1 In one case, the Fifth Circuit
considered twelve factors to be significant:
1. time and labor required;
2. novelty and difficulty of questions;
3. skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
4. preclusion of other employment;
5. customary fees for similar work in the community;
6. whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7. time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;
8. amount involved and results obtained;
9. experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;
10. the "undesirability" of the case;
11. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and
142
12. awards in similar cases.
138. Often, while purportedly following one method of fee computation, courts consider factors
or apply formulae from other methods.
139. Other factors such as the complexity of the case, the skill of the attorney, and the risk of
litigation have been identified as relevant but not of primary importance. Milstein v. Werner, 58
F.R.D. 544, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., 1970-71 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92,955, at 90,516 (Jan. 28, 1971).
140. See, e.g., Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 82 (6th Cir. 1955); Milstein v.
Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
A lower percentage of the total recovery often was awarded where the recovery exceeded one
million dollars. E.g., Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
afrd sub nom. Singer v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d (2d Cir. 1943); Mann v. Superior Court, 53
Cal. App. 2d 272, 274, 127 P.2d 970, 972 (1942); see Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative an
Class Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 259, 281 (1972); Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securitie,
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267, 276 (1978).
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974)
Angoffv. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 185-89 (1st Cir. 1959).
142. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974). Botl
Congress and the Supreme Court have citedJohnson with approval in a nonderivative suit context, S
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The third approach, which is known as the "lodestar" formula, has been
approved by at least seven federal courts of appeal.' 4 3 Unlike its
predecessors, the lodestar formula focuses on the hours spent by the attorney
on the case. The court initially determines the amount to which the attorney
would be entitled on the basis of an hourly rate of compensation applied to
the number of hours worked-this amount is the "lodestar" of the court's fee
determination. 14 4 Next, the court takes account of at least two other factors:
the "contingent nature of success" 14 5 (the risk of litigation) and the quality of
the attorney's work. 146 This second step determines a percentage amount by
which the lodestar figure should be increased or possibly decreased. 14 7 The
total fee awarded to the plaintiffs counsel is the sum of the lodestar amount
and any percentage bonus which the court has assessed on the basis of the
secondary factors. '

48

The earlier of the two A.L.I. proposals considered here adopts the
lodestar approach with two modifications. The A.L.I.'s November, 1984
proposal permits the court to consider factors in addition to the risk of
litigation and the quality of the attorney's work in computing the contingency
bonus. The court may award a bonus based on other "equitable factors"
including the impact of deferred attorney fee payment and the effect of the
award on the willingness of other attorneys to bring similar actions.' 49 A
more recent draft has deleted reference to either a lodestar calculation or
equitable factors in the black letter rule. Both A.L.I. proposals authorize a
reduction of the attorney fee if it exceeds a reasonable percentage of the total
recovery, including the value of nonpecuniary settlement terms.' 50 This
equitable cap on the attorney's hours-plus-bonus fee represents a
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976);
Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1546 (1984).
143. Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 473 n.1 (1981);
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov. 1984), supra note 88, § 7.18 comment c.
For the origins of the lodestar formula, see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
144. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
167-68 (3d Cir. 1973).
145. Id. at 168; Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the
greater the probability of plaintiffs success at trial or by settlement the less the fee award should
include a multiple of the hourly rate)..
146. In considering the quality of the attorney's work, the court considers the complexity and
novelty of the issues in the case, the quality of the work the judge has observed, and the amount of
recovery obtained. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).
147. Id; see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); Levenson v.
Overseas Shipbuilding Group, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 354, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Williams v. Schatz Mfg. Co.,
449 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
148. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
168 (3d Cir. 1973); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); Barnett v.
Pritzger, 73 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
149. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov. 1984), supra note 88, § 7.18 comment e. The delay in
payment is also considered in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 1985), supra note 88, § 7.17, Reporter's
Note 4, at 239-40.
150. See, e.g., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 1985), supra note 88, § 7.17 comment d.
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compromise between a pure percentage and a pure hourly formula and, as the
15 1
proposals suggest, is consistent with what courts do in practice.
2. Evaluation and Comparison. The efficacy of the various methods of fee
calculation can be evaluated by asking three questions: (1) Does the method
intuitively produce "fair" results? (2) Is the method practical so that it is
reasonably easy for courts to apply? and (3) What incentives for desirable and
undesirable behavior does the method provide?
a.

"Fairness" of result.

Irrespective of the method used, courts agree that

attorney fee awards in derivative litigation should be adequate to encourage

efforts to monitor the actions of corporate management,
so great as to encourage frivolous suits,'

53

5

2

but should not be

or result in a "windfall" to the

shareholder's attorney. 1 54 The percentage-of-the-recovery approach evoked
concern among courts because, in settlements involving substantial
recoveries, attorneys could receive extremely large fees without devoting
much time or effort to the case. By giving the court greater discretion, as the
multifactor approach does, or by computing compensation on the basis of
hours expended, as the lodestar formula does, the court could achieve greater
congruence between the fee award and the attorney's actual expenditure of
1 55
time and energy on the case.

Although more sensitive to the effort expended by the attorney, the newer
formulae introduce new inequities. Inequity under the multifactor approach
derives from the lack of clarity and specificity regarding the factors which are
most and least significant. 15 6 Under the multifactor approach, the factors
considered in a fee determination are merely identified seriatim without any
significant discussion of the court's reasoning process. As a consequence, the
guidelines for litigants and their attorneys are no more meaningful than a
general standard of reasonableness. 5 7 Though windfall fee awards might be
avoided under the multifactor approach, the downside of this approach is the
loss of predictability and consistency in fee awards. The court's ad hoc
determination of equitable compensation conveys little information to future
litigants and their counsel regarding the kinds of activity that will be rewarded

and those that will not.
151.

Id. §7.17, comment a.

152. Angoffv. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1959); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544,
549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Steinberg v. Hardy, 93 F. Supp. 873, 873 (D. Conn. 1950).
153. Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Steinberg v. Hardy, 93 F. Supp.
873, 873 (D. Conn. 1950).
154. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974); Weinberg v. Coastal
98,716, at 93,589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see Blum v.
States Gas Corp., 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
155. Coffee, supra note 91, at 241.
156. See Mowrey, supra note 140, at 304-05.
157. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974);
Angoffv. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959); Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., Uan.-June] SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 605, at A-17, A-18 (April 16, 1981).
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Inequity under the lodestar approach exists because attorneys are paid for
the length of time spent on a case regardless of how productive they are
during that time. In short, "inexperience, inefficiency, even incompetence
[are] rewarded."' 15 8 To some extent, this defect is avoided by the
intensified scrutiny" courts are expected to exercise under the lodestar
method. 59 But because courts see little of the attorney's preparation and
performance in cases settled prior to trial, inefficiency is difficult to detect.
Consequently, the attorney's hour-based fee is not discounted for
unproductive time spent on the case.
By introducing a "reasonable percentage of the total recovery" as a ceiling
on attorney fees, both A.L.I. proposals considered here eliminate the worst
abuses of the lodestar method. As the A.L.I. drafts concede, however, courts
often informally impose a similar ceiling even in the absence of specific
authorization. 60 The earlier A.L.I. draft explicitly enumerates a number of
factors courts may look at in determining whether an attorney is entitled to a
contingency bonus. Four factors are specifically identified, although the court
is allowed to consider other "equitable factors."' 61 The relative weight of
each of these factors is apparently left to the court since the draft does not
attach any values to the factors it identifies. Accordingly, the earlier proposal
expands the scope ofjudicial discretion so that, like the multifactor approach,
it reduces the predictability and consistency of the lodestar formula. The
exercise ofjudicial discretion, while explicitly contemplated in the later A.L.I.
draft concerning assessment of attorney fees, is no longer tied to concrete
guidelines in the black letter rule.
b. Ease of application. Obviously, if a method of calculation is
theoretically sound but impossible or at least very difficult to implement, it
has little value. While none of the fee calculation approaches outlined above
is impossible to apply, the ease with which they can be implemented varies
significantly.
The multifactor approach seems to be the easiest method to apply because
the court can consider practically anything it wants.' 6 2 Once the court
identifies the factors considered relevant to the fee determination, it may
avoid a rigorous analysis of the extent to which each factor affects the ultimate
dollar figure the attorney receives. ' 63 Even more fundamental, the court need
not identify its method of analysis. As a result, courts using the multifactor
158. "[W]hen hours become a criterion, economy of time may cease to be a virtue.
Inexperience, inefficiency, even incompetence will be rewarded. Expeditious termination of
litigation will be discouraged-to the great cost of all concerned, including the state." Hornstein,
supra note 135, at 660-61.
159. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
160. See, e.g., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 1985), supra note 88, § 7.17 comment a.
161.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Nov. 1984), supra note 88, § 7.18(a)(i).

162. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974);
Angoffv. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959); Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., [Jan.-June] SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 605, at A-17, A-18 (Apr. 16, 1981).

163.

See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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method have not indicated if they begin with some starting point and then
adjust the fee upward or downward to take account of the various factors, or if
each factor is quantified so that the sum of these amounts becomes the
attorney's fee. In fact, courts applying the multifactor approach may have
sought to avoid appellate criticism by obscuring exactly what their method of
analysis was.
The multifactor method is easy to use for several other reasons.
Nonpecuniary settlement terms 16 4 present little difficulty to a court applying a
multifactor method because the attorney's fee is not directly tied to the value
of the settlement he obtains for the corporation. If the size of the recovery is
a factor the court considers, less emphasis may be placed on that factor when
the settlement consists primarily of nonpecuniary benefits. Finally, the court
is not overwhelmed with papers documenting the attorney's time because the
fee is not calculated on the basis of the number of hours the attorney
65

worked. 1

In contrast to the multifactor method, the percentage-of-the-recovery
approach works easily only when the settlement is entirely monetary. In that
event, the court simply multiplies the total recovery by the determined
percentage. Some courts have applied a flat twenty percent formula to the
settlement value, 16 6 while others have adjusted the percentage because the
settlement is extremely large or for other reasons. 6 7 Even when the court
adjusts the percentage, the application of the formula to the settlement fund
is straightforward and involves little documentation by the attorney and little
of the court's time.
Applying a percentage formula becomes more difficult when the
settlement includes nonpecuniary terms. Because such terms by definition
have no precise monetary value, courts have not used a percentage formula,
opting instead to add a "reasonable" amount to the attorney's percentage of
the cash recovery to compensate him for obtaining the nonpecuniary
settlement terms. 68
The hours-plus-bonus approach of the lodestar method solves the
problem of nonpecuniary settlement terms, but it does so through the
introduction of complexity and the consumption of substantially more court
time. Courts must carefully examine the attorney's documentation of time
164. A reorganization of the corporation's board of directors, the appointment of a new
committee to study internal procedures, and additional disclosure of corporate financial information
are examples of nonpecuniary settlement terms.
165. Both the amount of recovery and the number of hours worked may, however, be factors the
court will consider. See Wolf v. Frank, 555 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1977); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F.
Supp. 1311, 1315 (D.D.C. 1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. Kiser v. Illuge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C.

Cir. 1974).
166. Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 82 (6th Cir. 1955); Neuman v. Electronic
Specialty Co., 1970-71 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,955, at 90,519 (Jan. 28, 1971).
167. Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), affid sub noma.Singer v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943).

168.

Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1955).

Page 229: Summer 1985]

DERIVATIVE SUIT SETTLEMENTS

spent on the case in order to discover any "padding" of the attorney's hours
or other time recorded for which he should only be partially-if at allcompensated. 169 Courts must also determine the7 0hourly rate which should be
used to compute the attorney's lodestar figure.'
The judicial task is further complicated by the contingency bonus aspect of
compensation under a lodestar approach. In considering the risk involved in
bringing suit, courts must make a difficult retrospective assessment of what
the successful plaintiffs chance of success appeared to be before the litigation
began.' 7 1 Manifestly, this assessment is extraordinarily difficult to makesomewhat like predicting the outcome of an election after the results are in.
Implementation of the first A.L.I. proposal differs very little from that of
the basic lodestar approach. Although courts have several more factors to
evaluate, the fundamental analytical process remains the same. Courts under
the second A.L.I. proposal could opt to use this approach as well. The new
"reasonable percentage of recovery" ceiling requires the court to question
whether the attorney's allowance, computed on an hourly basis, exceeds a
"reasonable percentage" of the settlement amount-but there are indications
that courts apply a similar "reasonableness" standard even in the absence of
an explicit ceiling.

1 72

c. Incentives. Legal commentary in the area of attorney fee computation
has recently focused on the incentives that fee computation formulae provide
for desirable and undesirable litigation behavior. 73 Although the
commentators who have ventured into this area look at different aspects of
attorney fee formulae and reach somewhat different conclusions with respect
to remedial measures, they have a common enemy in the reactive nature of
current attorney fee awards. 174 Present compensation methods treat
attorneys' litigation behavior as fixed and then attempt to calculate a
reasonable fee allowance for that behavior. According to the commentators,
if compensation formulae instead approached attorneys' behavior as
responsive to the method of calculating their fees, the formulae should
169. Noncompensable time includes, but is not limited to, hours spent duplicating the work of
other attorneys, hours spent on irrelevant matters, and, in some jurisdictions, hours spent preparing
the fee application. See Williams v. Schatz Mfg. Co., 449 F. Supp. 147, 151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re
Penn Central Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 907, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138
(3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Mackay Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 537 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
170. There is considerable controversy as to whether the attorney should be compensated on
the basis of his own hourly rate or the general rate in the community and, for either rate, which
noncontingent hourly rate should be considered comparable to the derivative suit rate. See Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp. 443, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Entin v.
Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Green v. Wolf Corp., 69 F.R.D. 568, 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
171. Leubsdorf, supra note 143, at 486.
172. Mowrey, supra note 140, at 276; see, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517
F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 1976); Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
$ 98,716, at 93,589 (1982).
173. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91; Coffee, supra note 91; Coffee, supra note Ill;
Leubsdorf, supra note 143; Mowrey, supra note 140.
174. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91; Coffee, supra note 91; Leubsdorf, supra note 143.
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attempt to provide incentives for desirable kinds of litigation behavior and

disincentives for undesirable behavior. This section of the note examines the
incentives that the three fee computation methods provide.
By obscuring the method of analysis, the multifactor approach also hides
the incentives it provides. One discernible incentive, however, results from
the lack of predictability and consistency inherent in the nebulous standards
of the multifactor approach. Common sense suggests that, if the attorney is
unable to predict the amount of fees he will receive should he succeed, he will
try to minimize the risk of litigation by bringing a high volume of cases. 1 7 5
Consequently, the attorney is unable to invest much time or effort in any
single case and is therefore likely to be satisfied with a relatively low
settlement. This incentive creates many poorly handled derivative suits, a
significant portion of which are of questionable merit.
The lodestar method of fee computation 76 produces incentives for both
desirable and undesirable conduct by the plaintiffs counsel. On the positive
side, the lodestar formula encourages full investigation and negotiation of
derivative claims because counsel is compensated for the hours worked.1 77
Unfortunately, the lodestar method's hour-based compensation also
promotes dilatory conduct and duplicative services by the plaintiffs counsel.
To the extent the attorney's working time is not completely consumed by
equally well-paying cases, the attorney has an economic incentive to conduct
extensive discovery, perform lengthy research, and stretch out settlement
negotiations in order to maximize the number of hours for which he will be
compensated.1 78 The client's economic interest, on the other hand, is served
when the attorney works the greatest number of hours which correspond to a
79
positive marginal rate of recovery.1
Even more importantly, the attorney has a strong incentive to accept a
settlement once he has expended a substantial amount of time on a case in
order to avoid the risk of losing in litigation. This incentive may cause the
attorney to accept a settlement that his clients would consider insufficient.18 0
Thus, the lodestar method of fee computation provides incentives for
litigation conduct in conflict with the client's best interests.
Another incentive created by the hourly fee method is inducement of tacit
collusion between the plaintiff's counsel and the defendant. The plaintiff's
attorney wants to maximize his fee. The defendant wants to minimize his
175. Coffee, supra note 91, at 231. The attorney's risk diversification may be analogized to a
portfolio investment approach.
176. Because the A.L.I. proposals adopt the basic lodestar approach with relatively minor
adjustments, the drafts probably would create incentives similar to those of the "pure" lodestar
formula.
177. The lodestar formula thus compares favorably with a percentage approach which tends to
encourage premature settlement. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
178. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91, at 536; Coffee, supra note 91, at 240; Herzel & Hogan,
PlaintifsAttorney Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, LITIG., Winter 1979, at 25.
179. The marginal rate of recovery equals the additional settlement recovery generated by the
last hour worked by the attorney.
180. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 36.
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liability. Both parties can obtain what they want by holding a settlement
agreement for several months while the plaintiff's attorney expends sufficient
time to justify a substantial fee under the lodestar formula. In exchange for
this delay in presenting the settlement to the court, the attorney will be
amenable to the defendant's offer of a smaller settlement amount.' 8' The
defendant's counsel also has no reason to be dissatisfied because, through
procrastination, he can charge his own client for the additional time he
spends. Put succinctly, a time-based formula "provides the adversaries with a
method by which they can assure themselves that the desired fee will be
82
awarded if the settlement is approved."'
Finally, the lodestar formula also has been criticized for providing an
incentive to initiate weak lawsuits.' 8 3 Because the contingency bonus
increases as the risk of litigation becomes greater, attorneys have an economic
inducement to bring riskier-and that often means weaker-cases. 8 4 This is
the very kind of behavior that courts do not want to encourage.
A percentage formula, like the lodestar formula, rewards both desirable
and undesirable litigation behavior, but its incentives are precisely opposite
those provided by the lodestar formula. The strongest criticism of a
percentage approach is that it encourages premature settlements which are
not in the best interest of the corporation. 18 5 A percentage formula
encourages a premature settlement since an attorney will only work the
number of hours for which his marginal rate of compensation 18 6 is equal to
his opportunity cost,18 7 while the client's economic interests are best served if

the attorney works as many hours as possible so long as the marginal rate of
recovery' 8 8 is still positive.' 89 Thus, the attorney may be satisfied with a small
settlement amount if he can obtain that amount by expending little time and
effort. On the other hand, the client's interests are maximized by holding out
for a larger settlement regardless of how much time his attorney has to spend
to get it.

One commentator also has criticized the percentage method of fee
calculation for exacerbating the tendency of attorneys to "piggyback" on
government investigations and prosecutions.' 90 Because the research costs
necessary to investigate and develop new derivative cases are considerably
lower when the SEC has initiated proceedings or conducted an investigation
of the same activities, attorneys tend to initiate suits which can take advantage
of government proceedings, and are far less likely to sue when the
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
last hour
187.
188.
189.
190.

Coffee, supra note 91, at 247.
Id.
Leubsdorf, supra note 143, at 474.
Id.
See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91, at 543-46; Coffee, supra note 91, at 268.
The marginal rate of compensation equals the additional compensation generated by the
the attorney worked.
Opportunity cost is the income the attorney could have earned by working on other cases.
See supra note 179.
Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91, at 543-46.
Coffee, supra note 91, at 249.
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government has not taken the lead. 19 ' As a result, private actions tend to
duplicate rather than supplement public enforcement efforts. 192 The
attorney's incentive to press only those claims for which he can obtain
information collected by the SEC is greatest under a percentage method of
fee calculation because only the attorney's results are compensated, not the
time he spends on the case.
Nevertheless, the percentage-of-the-recovery formula at least partially
aligns the attorney's own economic interests with those of his client. The
higher the settlement obtained, the higher the attorney's fee allowance will
be; in effect, the attorney and client become "partners."'' 93 The attorney thus
has no incentive to compromise his client's cause of action to obtain higher
fees for himself. The attorney also has no incentive to delay the settlement
process since his fees are the same regardless of when the settlement
agreement is submitted to the court for its approval. By partially aligning the
attorney's interest with those of his client, a percentage-of-the-recovery
method of fee computation largely avoids the conflict of interest problem
inherent in the lodestar method's hour-based formula.
3. A Fee Computation Proposal. Based on the strengths of the percentage-ofthe-recovery approach-its predictability, its simplicity, and its (at least
partial) alignment of attorney and client interests-this note proposes a
needed return to that method with only minor modifications. In addition to
its practical strengths, the percentage method best effectuates the objectives
of derivative litigation. Our proposal could be instituted either by courts or
by legislatures and includes the following basic provisions:
The court, upon approving the settlement of a derivative suit, should
award the shareholder's attorney a presumptive percentage of the corporation's
gross recovery. In determining the gross recovery, the court should expressly
determine the value of any nonpecuniary settlement terms and include their
value in the gross recovery. The presumptive percentage should be awarded
except where:
(1) the suit and its settlement were unusually beneficial to the
corporation or the public and this unusual benefit is not fully reflected
194
in the gross recovery;
(2) the suit followed and took advantage of information obtained in a
government investigation or prosecution; or
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
193. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 91, at 543-46.
194. Because the presumptive percentage is keyed to the corporation's gross recovery, it is not
sensitive to indemnification amounts paid to the individual defendants by the corporation. Although
such amounts clearly affect the net benefit to the corporation, taking them into account would result
in diminishing the plaintiffs attorney fee percentage as the settlement amount becomes larger.
Aside from the obvious incongruity which would result, the plaintiffs attorney could not tailor his
behavior (in bringing derivative claims) in response to indemnification amounts because of the
extreme difficulty in predicting these amounts. In addition, a corporation could use generous
indemnification plans to ward off derivative suits.
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(3) awarding the presumptive percentage would result in unreasonably
high compensation for the attorney in relation to the work he
performed.
The attorney's percentage of the gross recovery should be
increased under circumstance (1) and decreased under circumstances
(2) and (3) by an amount which the court determines is appropriate.
The analysis under the proposed formula begins with an assumption that a
predetermined percentage of the value of the derivative settlement (perhaps
twenty to twenty-five percent) is a reasonable and appropriate fee allowance

for the plaintiffs attorney under most circumstances. 19 5 This assumption is
based upon data which indicate that, even when courts apply an hourly fee
formula, attorney fee awards generally constitute twenty to thirty percent of
the total settlement.' 9 6 The proposed formula is also based upon the
assumption that, although nonpecuniary settlement terms present greater
difficulty than a cash settlement, the court can reach a reasonable estimation
of the dollar value of the nonpecuniary terms and include that estimated value
97
in the gross recovery upon which the percentage fee is calculated.
The proposal does acknowledge, however, that courts will be faced with
settlements for which a twenty to twenty-five percent fee award would be
plainly inequitable.' 9-8 The three situations in which a percentage formula
may result in unreasonable fees are: (1) where the derivative suit produced a
benefit (in particular, the deterrence of corporate mismanagement) which is
not completely reflected in the monetary value of the settlement; (2) where
the attorney expended relatively little time or effort in investigating and
developing his case because he substantially relied upon information
produced by a governmental investigation or prosecution; 99 and (3) where
applying the standard percentage formula would result in a "windfall" to the
attorney in relation to the work he performed on the case.2 0 0 Under these
195.
196.

See generally Hornstein, supra note 40.
See Coffee, supra note 91, at 241 n.63; Mowrey, supra note 140, at 337; CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (june 1985), supra note 88, § 7.17 comment c.
197. Depending on the willingness of courts to attribute high values to nonpecuniary settlement
terms, the presumptive percentage approach may produce a bias toward or against nonpecuniary
relief. Some commentators have argued that present methods of fee calculation, particularly the
lodestar method, induce agreements for nonpecuniary relief at the expense of pecuniary relief.
Because the presumptive percentage method outlined here requires the court to place an explicit
dollar value on the nonpecuniary relief, it at least necessitates a realistic appraisal by the court of the
benefits produced by that relief and thus may halt the recent trend toward "therapeutic" relief. See
Coffee, supra note 91, at 267; Coffee, supra note I1ll, at 40.
198. An additional and important constraint on the attorney's fee is the court's authority to
disapprove the settlement itself. If the court, for example, believes the shareholder's claim was
compromised prematurely, it can refuse to sanction the proposed settlement.
199. If the court believes the attorney was able to save considerable time by taking advantage of
a prior government proceeding or investigation very similar to the derivative claim, the court would
adjust the attorney's percent downward to, perhaps, 15%.
200. The court thus could reduce the attorney's compensation if it believed the settlement was
essentially fair to the shareholders but was concerned that the attorney settled too soon or was less
diligent than was in the client's best interest.
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circumstances, courts should exercise their discretion to adjust the percentage
of recovery upward or downward.
Returning to a percentage-of-the-recovery approach would ameliorate two
fundamental problems of derivative suit settlements. By greatly simplifying
the procedure courts use to determine counsel's compensation, the
percentage-of-the-recovery approach reduces the burden on the courts 20 ' and
increases the predictability and consistency of fee awards. The percentage
formula would also realign the attorney's economic interest to coincide with
that of the corporation. A modified percentage-of-the-recovery formula
removes the incentive for collusion between counsel for the parties, thereby
reinforcing a ban on the contemporaneous discussion of the settlement and
the plaintiffs attorney fees. While the reinstitution of a percentage fee
formula may tend to encourage the premature settlement of claims, the
court's authority to reject the settlement provides an effective restraint against

such undesirable behavior.
IV
CONCLUSION

Two broad themes underlie the issues explored in this note. The first is
that the shareholders' legal representative must have objectives similar to
those of his clients if the derivative action is to be an effective means of
remedying and preventing abuses by corporate management. Ensuring that
the shareholders and their counsel pursue similar goals is most effectively
achieved by changing the method by which attorney fees are awarded to
provide counsel with incentives to behave in a manner consistent with the
corporation's best interests. More specifically, this note advocates three
changes in the method of computing attorney fees. First, the method should
emphasize the attorney's results rather than the amount of time he devoted to
the case. Second, courts should be reluctant to award fees on the basis of
nonpecuniary settlement terms unless some dollar value can be reasonably
attached to those terms. Third, the attorney should be protected from efforts
by intervenors' counsel to obtain a share of the fee award by limiting the
number of plaintiffs attorneys eligible for court-awarded fees.
The second underlying theme is that, while court approval of settlements
is an essential aspect of derivative litigation, its limitations cannot be
overlooked. When both plaintiff and defendant advocate the same positionapproval of their negotiated settlement-the court's task of assuring the
fairness of the settlement becomes an extremely difficult one. Prohibiting
contemporaneous negotiation of the settlement amount and attorney fees and
encouraging objectors who present the court with independent information
permit the court to examine the settlement and thereby assure its fairness
without requiring an exhaustive investigation into every aspect of the
201. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. "A request for attorney's fees should not
result in a second major litigation." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 427 (1983).
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settlement. In addition, changing the method of computing attorney fees
from an hour-based formula to a percentage-of-the-recovery approach
relieves the court of its virtually impossible duty to monitor attorneys' time
and performance.
The peculiar consequences and concerns involved in shareholder
derivative suit settlements explored in this note are the direct result of the
unique relationships among participants in this type of litigation. If the
derivative suit is to continue (or even attempt) to be "the chief regulator of
corporate management," courts and commentators must focus on how these
unique relationships can be reshaped to promote the best interests of the
corporation.

